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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992) which grants jurisdiction 
over cases transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the District Court properly grant Judgment on 
the Pleadings in favor of plaintiff, Mountain America Credit 
Union ("Mountain America"), when it was clear and unambiguous, 
based on the pleadings alone, that defendant McClellan was 
personally liable on the promissory note? This is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 
104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
II. Did the District Court properly deny McClellan7s 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment which was brought over eight months 
after the judgment was entered and was supported only by 
inadmissible hearsay evidence? The reviewing court should 
examine this issue under an abuse of discretion standard because 
denial of a motion to set aside judgment on the pleadings is 
analogous to denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment. 
The denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Russell v. 
Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984); Gardiner and Gardiner 
Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1982). 
III. Did the District Court properly deny McClellan7s 
second Motion to Set Aside Judgment which was based upon Mountain 
America's alleged failure to comply with the "one action" rule? 
1 
This is also an abuse of discretion standard of review because, 
as described above*, a motion to set aside judgment on the 
pleadings is so closely analogous to a motion to set aside a 
default judgment. Russell, 681 P.2d at 1194; Gardiner, 656 P.2d 
at 430. 
IV. Did the District Court properly deny McClellan's 
Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint and to Assert a 
Cross-claim? This is an abuse of discretion standard. Girard v. 
Appleby, 600 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
STATUTES: 
1. Utah Code Annotated section 57-4a-2 (1990) reads in 
relevant part: "A recorded document imparts notice of its 
contents regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in 
its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment." 
2. Utah Code Annotated section 70A-3-403 (1992) reads 
in relevant part: "An authorized representative who signs his own 
name to an instrument . . . is personally obligated if the 
instrument names the person represented but does not show that 
the representative signed in a representative capacity . . . ." 
3. Utah Code Annotated section 78-37-1 (1992) reads in 
relevant part: "There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage 
upon real estate which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter." 
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RULES: 
1. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets 
forth in relevant part: "In a pleading to a preceding pleading, a 
party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction . . . 
estoppel . . . and any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense." 
2. Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in pertinent part: "A party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present . . . in his answer or reply 
tt 
. . . . 
3. Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in relevant part: a party may plead a "cross-claim . . 
. against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence 
that is the subject matter of the original transaction. . . . " 
4. Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in relevant part, that once a responsive pleading has 
been filed, "a party may amend his [or her] pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
5. Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature and Course of Proceedings: This appeal 
involves defendant McClellan's personal liability on a promissory 
note signed by him on June 5, 1984. (Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. at 
4.) The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor 
of plaintiff Mountain America and against defendant McClellan on 
January 23, 1990. (R. at 41.) This is an appeal taken from the 
following rulings of the Fifth District Court: (1) an Order 
granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Mountain America 
entered on January 23, 1990; (2) an Order denying McClellan7s 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) entered on 
October 16, 1990; (3) an Order denying McClellan's Motion to 
Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) entered 
on January 30, 1992; and (4) an Order denying McClelland Motion 
for Leave to file a Third Party Complaint and to Assert a Cross-
Claim entered on December 27, 1991. 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented: 
This appeal arises from the default on a loan made to Calistoga 
Corporation ("Calistoga") as a corporation and Robert E. 
McClellan ("McClellan") and Randy Hoyt ("Hoyt") as individuals. 
(R. at 2.) Mountain America became the successor in interest to 
Horizon Thrift after the latter went into receivership. (R. at 
2.) The loan was made on or about June 5, 1984, and total 
payment was due thereunder on September 10, 1984. (R. at 4.) 
McClellan and Hoyt evidenced the loan by signing a 
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promissory note ("Note") twice under the space provided for 
"Maker's/Debtor's Signature(s)" — signing once on the lower left 
by indicating their representative capacity as officers of 
Calistoga; signing a second time on the lower right as 
individuals by not limiting their signature with any corporate 
qualification. (R. at 4.) 
Mountain America brought an action against McClellan 
and Hoyt as co-defendants for the then outstanding debt of 
$40,192.63. (R. at 2.) Hoyt was later dismissed without 
prejudice. (R. at 176.) McClellan answered the Complaint on 
September 12, 1989, admitting that he signed the Note, and 
failing to make any defense of fact as to why his individual 
signature appeared thereon. (R. at 9-11.) 
On November 6, 1989, Mountain America filed a Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings. (R. at 15.) Having reviewed the 
relevant pleadings and the relevant motion, objection, and 
response to judgment thereon, the District Court entered an Order 
granting judgment in favor of Mountain America on January 23, 
1990. (R. at 41-42.) 
Mountain America served on McClellan a Request for 
Admission, in which McClellan admitted personal liability on the 
Note. The Request and Response read as follows: 
Request No. l: Admit that on or about 
the 5th day of June, 1984, you executed and 
delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note and 
Disclosure in the amount of $30,420.00 as 
secretary of the corporation Callistoga Court 
Club, Inc. and personally, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto. 
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Response No, 1: Admitted. 
(R. at 22.) Although the theory of McClellan's personal 
liability formed the basis of Mountain America's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings (Trans. Hearing October 2, 1990 at 10), 
there is no evidence in the record that Mountain America or the 
District Court relied on the above admission in seeking or 
granting the Motion. (R. at 15-20, 30-36, 41-42.) 
On September 24, 1990, eight months after judgment had 
been entered against him, McClellan filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment based on inadmissible hearsay evidence. (R. at 74, 81-
83, 232; Trans. Hearing October 2, 1990 at 12-13.) At a hearing 
on the motion, the District Court found "no other factual basis 
— or no other basis in the record for any other explanation of 
why they [McClellan and Hoyt] signed the note, other than they 
were agreeing to be responsible for it." (R. at 232; Trans. 
Hearing October 2, 1990 at 13.) Thus, on October 16, 1990, the 
District Court entered an Order denying McClellan's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. (R. at 88-89.) 
McClellan's counsel discovered for the first time in 
November 1991, over two years after Mountain America's Complaint 
had been filed, that the loan to his client had been secured by 
real property. (R. at 142-43.) Based on an alleged violation of 
the "one-action" rule, McClellan filed a Motion to Reconsider and 
Set Aside Judgment on November 13, 1991. (R. at 136-37.) 
Mountain America objected to McClellan's motion on the grounds 
that a prior lienholder had foreclosed out Mountain America's 
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interest in the security before Mountain America had filed their 
Complaint. (R. at 158-59.) On January 30, 1992, the District 
Court denied McClellan7s Motion to Reconsider. (R. at 220.) 
On October 28, 1991, McClellan filed a Motion for Leave 
to File a Third-Party Complaint and to Assert a Cross-claim. (R. 
at 111.) After oral argument on the motion, the District Court 
entered an Order dismissing Hoyt without prejudice and denying 
McClellan7s motions to file a third-party complaint and assert a 
cross-claim. (R. at 191.) The court stated: "Defendant, 
McClellan, should have and could have raised the issues he now 
seeks to raise prior to judgment, rather than now nearly two 
years after judgment." (R. at 192.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly granted Mountain America7s 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for two reasons. First, 
McClellan7s Answer did not deny the debt, nor is it a sufficient 
basis to ignore a document that is clear and unambiguous on its 
face. Second, the law is well settled that where the signer7s 
name appears unambiguously, extraneous evidence showing intent 
with which the instrument was signed is inadmissible. 
The District Court properly denied McClellan7s 
September 24, 1990 Motion to Set Aside Judgment. A reviewing 
court should examine whether a Motion to Set Aside Judgment is 
correctly denied based on an abuse of discretion standard. The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
McClellan7s Motion to Set Aside Judgment. First, there is no 
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evidence in the record that the District Court considered matters 
outside the pleadings. Second, McClellan attempted to set aside 
the judgment based on inadmissible hearsay evidence contained in 
Shumate's (McClellan's counsel) affidavit. McClellan had over 
eight months to discover admissible evidence to establish his 
defense. Third, Shumate's affidavit could not have been treated 
as a Rule 56(f) affidavit since it was submitted in support of a 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the Pleadings, not in opposition 
to summary judgment as is required under Rule 5(5 (f). 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied McClellan7s November 13, 1991 Motion to Reconsider and Set 
Aside Judgment. First, McClellan waived the right to raise the 
one-action rule as an affirmative defense when he failed to raise 
it in his responsive pleading, over two years eeirlier. 
Attempting to raise the defense more than two ye»ars after filing 
his Answer is grossly untimely and violates the fundamental 
principle of judicial economy. Second, even if McClellan had 
properly raised the one-action rule as an affirmative defense, 
Mountain America never violated the rule because a senior 
lienholder foreclosed on the property before Mountain America 
brought the instant action against McClellan. A typographical 
error in the legal description of the real property collateral 
did not place Mountain America in the position of senior 
lienholder. Furthermore, based on Utah law, Mountain America was 
under no obligation to allege and prove that a senior lienholder 
had previously foreclosed on the real property collateral. 
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Third, even if properly raised as an affirmative defense, and 
even if Mountain America does not qualify for the junior 
lienholder exception, at most the one-action rule would operate 
as a waiver of Mountain America7s right to foreclose on the real 
property collateral. McClellan would still be personally liable 
on the Note. 
McClellan's Motion for Leave to Amend his Answer was 
properly denied by the District Court. The court's ruling did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion. First, McClellan's Motion 
for Leave came unreasonably late in the proceeding — over two 
years after McClellan filed his Answer. Second, the substance of 
McClellan's "new" allegations were known more than two years 
prior to bringing the motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF, MOUNTAIN AMERICA, WHEN IT WAS 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, BASED ON THE 
PLEADINGS ALONE, THAT DEFENDANT 
MCCLELLAN WAS PERSONALLY LIABLE ON THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
Defendant McClellan's personal liability on the 
promissory note ("Note") which is the subject of this suit is 
clear and unambiguous. McClellan's liability in his individual 
capacity is evident from the pleadings alone. The Note was 
incorporated as part of the original complaint and unquestionably 
demonstrates McClellan's liability based on having affixed his 
signature thereto as an individual, without any reference to a 
corporation or any representative capacity. (Addendum Exhibit 
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"A"; R. at 4.) In fact, McClellan has never disputed whether the 
signature was his, nor has he disputed the manner in which he 
signed. Because the Note was clear and unambiguous, the District 
Court properly granted judgment in favor of Mountain America and 
against McClellan. 
A. McClellan's mere allegation that the 
Note was signed in his representative 
capacity did not deny the debt and is 
not a sufficient basis to ignore a 
document that is clear and iiwamiviquQiig 
on its face. 
In response to Mountain American's allegation that 
"Defendants executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note 
or Installment Loan Agreement" (Complaint 5 2; R. at 2), 
McClellan responded by simply alleging: "The Defendant admits 
that he executed the Promissory note or Installment Loan 
Agreement, but affirmatively asserts that his execution of that 
agreement was in his capacity as the secretary of the Calistoga 
Court Club, Inc." (Answer 5 2, R. at 10.) 
Mountain America concedes that McClellan signed the 
Note in his representative capacity as Secretary of the Calistoga 
Court Club, Inc. However, the Note conclusively establishes that 
McClellan also signed the Note in his personal capacity. In the 
space provided for the "Makers/Debtor's Signature(s)," McClellan 
signed twice. (Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. at 4.) McClellan signed 
once on the lower left hand side of the Note, referencing his 
representative capacity as Secretary, by writing in "sec" after 
his name. McClellan signed a second time on the lower right hand 
10 
side without adding any qualification. (Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 
at 4.) To argue that McClellan signed the same Note twice in his 
representative capacity makes no sense. Why would one sign the 
same Note twice for the same corporation? Furthermore, why would 
one sign the Note in two distinctly different ways, allegedly 
fulfilling the same function? 
In addition to the logical inconsistency of McClellan's 
argument, to merely allege that McClellan signed the Note in his 
representative capacity does not deny Mountain America's claim, 
nor does it controvert evidence that is clear and unambiguous on 
its face. The commonly accepted rule of law has been summarized 
as follows: 
Every person whose name appears on a bill or 
note is prima facie liable in the capacity 
indicated by the position, whether as maker, 
drawer, acceptor, or indorser, in which his 
name appears, unless there is some 
qualification, limitation or extension of his 
liability annexed thereto. . . . Where the 
signature is in the usual place for the 
signature of the maker or drawer, there is a 
presumption that the signature is in that 
capacity. 
12 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes § 1172 (1964). 
Because McClellan signed the Note without 
qualification, and because he signed the Note in the space 
provided for the "maker/debtor,,f he is presumptively personally 
liable on the Note. Merely alleging McClellan signed the Note in 
his representative capacity is not sufficient to deny a debt that 
is clear and unambiguous. Such an allegation is reminiscent of a 
wise farmer who was once heard to say: "Just because you call a 
11 
pig a cow, it don't mean you can milk it." In sum, the trial 
court properly ruled that on the face of the pleadings, a defense 
to personal liability had not been established. 
B• Utah law, as well as that of other 
jurisdictions, clearly establishes that 
where the signer's name appears 
unambiguously, there should be no 
admission of extraneous evidence to show 
the intent with which an agent signed 
the instrument. 
The District Court's judgment on the pleadings in favor 
of Mountain America should be upheld on review. Because the Note 
is unambiguous on its face, the court would not have been able to 
examine extrinsic evidence. It is a longstanding principle of 
negotiable instruments law that the issue of whether an 
authorized representative will be held personally liable on a 
note is whether his signature is ambiguous. John S. Herbrand, 
Annotation, Construction and Application of UCC S 3-403(2) 
Dealing With Personal Liability of Authorized Representative Who 
Signs Negotiable Instrument in His Own Name, 97 A.L.R.3d 798, 802 
(1980). The District Court ruling should be affirmed because it 
is clear and unambiguous that McClellan signed the Note so as to 
incur individual liability. 
As early as 1919, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The law is well settled that where an agent 
has signed a contract in a personal capacity 
— this is, executed it in a manner clearly 
indicating that the liability is his alone — 
extrinsic proof is not admissible to 
discharge him from liability upon it. If he 
personally is, in unambiguous terms, bound to 
fulfill, he must fulfill. 
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Roe v, Schweitzer. 55 Utah 204, 212, 184 P. 938, 941 (Utah 1919). 
Roe involved an action to recover from an officer of a gold 
mining company $200 paid to him for stock, for which he receipted 
individually and without designation as such officer. Id. at 
205-10. The Court held that extrinsic proof that he acted in an 
official capacity was not admissible to discharge him from 
liability. Id. at 212. 
This "well settled" evidentiary principle in Roe was 
subsequently adopted in Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 
577, 74 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1938). The appellant in Starlev 
contended that he was liable in his representative capacity as 
secretary of Deseret Foods, even though he had signed the $2,500 
promissory note as simply "Grant Morgan." The Supreme Court, 
found that there was no ambiguity in the manner the note was 
signed. Id. at 581-82, 74 P.2d at 1223. In fact, the Court 
stated "[t]here would be no uncertainty or ambiguity unless parol 
evidence is first introduced to cause such uncertainty." Id. In 
conclusion the Starley court stated: 
Courts have been quite ready to open the case 
to parol evidence to explain the intention of 
the maker where there is anything on the face 
of the note giving rise to ambiguity. . . . 
But where there is no ambiguity, the rule 
will not be relaxed. The intention of the 
parties must be gathered from the instrument 
itself. Any other rule would tend to destroy 
the value of written instruments. 
Id. at 584, 74 P.2d at 1224. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-3-403 (1992), Utah's 
adoption of Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-403, sets forth in 
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relevant part: "An authorized representative who signs his own 
name to an instrument . . . is personally obligeited if the 
instrument names the person represented but does not show that 
the representative signed in a representative capacity . . . ." 
This statute embodies many of the principles pertaining to the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence, and the personal liability 
of individuals purportedly signing in their representative 
capacities. 
For example, the more recent case of Bushnell Real 
Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah 1983)(opinion by 
Durham, J.), involved a suit to collect on a promissory note. 
The note had been signed by each of the defendants in his 
capacity as an individual. Id. The Supreme Court concluded 
that "there are no facts alleged by defendants from which the 
court could conclude that the note upon which plaintiff brings 
suit is unclear, ambiguous . . . ." Id. at 752. 
The Utah Supreme Court has overturned trial courts that 
have allowed extrinsic evidence to come in to show the motivation 
of a signer of a promissory note, that otherwise clearly and 
unambiguously establishes the personal liability of the maker. 
See, e.g., Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 
(Utah 1981). In Tanner, the Court held that admission of 
evidence that the bank's agent Robert Chatfield assured the 
signer that only a co-signer had liability on the note was 
reversible error. Id. Viewed "objectively and reasonably," the 
Court concluded, the note itself "reflects that McGraw [the 
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debtor] signed in his individual capacity as a co-maker of the 
note." Id^ _ at 1062. 
As capably set forth in Tanner. 
[t]he basic rule of contract 
interpretation is that the intent of the 
parties is to be ascertained from the content 
of the instrument itself, the rationale for 
the rule being to preserve the sanctity of 
written instruments. . . . It is only when 
an ambiguity exists which cannot be 
reconciled by an objective and reasonable 
interpretation of the contract as a whole 
that resort may be had to the use of 
extrinsic evidence. 
Id. 
The majority of jurisdictions follow Utah,s approach. 
For example, Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Ferrusi, 384 N.Y.S.2d 596 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976), involved a case where the execution of a 
promissory note by the individuals was admitted, and there was no 
showing that the individuals signed in a representative capacity. 
The court held that under U.C.C. section 3-403(2)(a) there was no 
triable issue of fact and the individuals were personally liable 
on the note as a matter of law despite the fact that the 
individuals, in opposition to a motion for summary judgment by 
the payee, contended that the promissory note was forwarded to 
the payee with an accompanying letter which stated that the 
individuals signed the note as officers of the alleged corporate 
principal. Id. at 597-98. See also Bank v. Cannon. 414 So. 2d 
926 (Ala. 1982); Gainok v. Featherson. 641 P.2d 909 (Ariz. App. 
1982); Starlev v. Deseret Foods Corp.. 74 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Utah 
1938)(listing early cases in other jurisdictions that follow 
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Utah). 
That McClellan signed the Note twice is prima facie 
evidence in and of itself that the parties intended McClellan to 
be personally liable under the Note. The universal practice in 
the commercial world is that where individual liability is 
demanded, "the corporate officer signs twice, once as an officer 
and again as an individual." 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1838 
(1985) ; see also East Tincup. Inc. v. Asphalt Pcivincr Co.. 470 
P.2d 58 (Colo. App. 1970) (officers signed once cis officers and a 
second time as individuals); Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck. 176 N.E.2d 
74 (N.Y. 1961). "The signature of an individual on the face of a 
note, at the bottom on the right, without limiting or descriptive 
words before or after it, is the universal method of signing a 
contract to assume a personal obligation." 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills 
and Notes § 556 (1963)(footnotes omitted). 
Based on Utah law as well as the law of other 
jurisdictions, McClellan is personally liable on the Note. His 
Answer did not deny the debt. Thus, judgment on the pleadings 
was proper where the Note is clear and unambiguous on its face. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
MCCLELLAN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS WHICH WAS 
BROUGHT OVER EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE 
JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AND WAS SUPPORTED 
ONLY BY INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 
The District Court entered its Order, properly granting 
Mountain America's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on 
January 23, 1990. (R. at 41.) McClellan did not file his Motion 
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to Set Aside Judgment until September 24, 1990, over eight months 
after the Order had been entered, (R. at 74), and over thirteen 
months after the Complaint had been filed, (R. at 2)• At a 
hearing held on October 2, 1990, the District Court denied 
McClellan's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. at 232; Trans, of 
Hearing Oct. 2, 1990 at 12-13.) 
A. The proper standard of review to apply 
when considering whether a motion to set 
aside is properly denied is an abuse of 
discretion standard. 
McClellan states the second issue for review as 
follows: "Did the District Court err in granting judgment on the 
pleadings when McClellan, in a specific affidavit, pointed to 
discoverable evidence he had not been given an opportunity to 
obtain that would establish his defense?" (Appellant's Brief at 
1.) McClellan incorrectly concludes that this is a "question of 
law" standard of review. Id. The "discoverable evidence" 
McClellan refers to was presented to the District Court in 
conjunction with a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (R. at 74-84.) 
Thus, the proper standard of review to apply is an "abuse of 
discretion" standard. It was within the broad discretion of the 
District Court to determine whether the "discoverable evidence" 
presented justified setting aside its Order granting judgment in 
favor of Mountain America. 
Mountain America has attempted to locate case law 
governing the specific standard a reviewing court should apply 
when examining a trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside 
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judgment. Not finding any law on this narrow issue, Mountain 
America believes that turning to an analogous area of the law 
provides the answer. 
McClellan's Motion to Set Aside Judgment closely 
parallels, inter alia, motions to set aside a default judgment. 
The standard of review in this area of the law is well-settled. 
The trial court has broad discretion to deny a motion to set 
aside a default judgment. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 
(Utah 1984); Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 
429, 430 (Utah 1982). The standard was specifically set forth in 
Russell. 681 P.2d at 1194, where the court stated that ff[b]road 
discretion is accorded the trial court in ruling on relief from a 
judgment; and, this Court will reverse that ruling only if it is 
clear the trial court abused its discretion." This statement is 
broad enough to include a ruling on relief from any judgment, of 
which judgment on the pleadings is just one. As set forth in 
Valley Leasing, Etc. v. Houghton. 661 P.2d 959, 960, 960 n.2 
(Utah 1983), relief under Rule 60(b) (dealing with motions to set 
aside judgment) is not limited to default judgments. 
McClellan brought his September 24, 1990 Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. at 74.) Because McClellan was seeking relief 
from a judgment, the proper standard of review to apply is an 
abuse of discretion standard. 
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B. The District Court properly denied 
McClellan's Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
— a ruling that was clearly within its 
broad powers of discretion, 
McClellan first argues that he was not given "notice 
that matters outside the pleadings would be considered." 
(Appellants Brief at 12.) 
1. There is no evidence in the record that 
the District Court considered matters 
outside the pleadings. 
McClellan admits that "[t]he record demonstrates that 
prior to entry of the January 23, 1990 order, nothing outside the 
pleadings was presented to the court in support of the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings." (Appellant's Brief at 11-12; 
footnote omitted.) McClellan's position is logically 
inconsistent. McClellan cannot reasonably admit that nothing 
outside the pleadings was presented to the court, and then turn 
around and assert that they should have been given notice that 
matters outside the pleadings were to be considered.1 
1This is just one example of McClellan's inconsistent and 
largely frivolous arguments. Another example involves 
McClellan's most recent explanation of why it admitted Mountain 
America's Request No. 1 of Mountain America's Requests for 
Admissions. The full text of the Request and Response is as 
follows: 
Request No. 1; Admit that on or about 
the 5th day of June, 1984, you executed and 
delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note and 
Disclosure in the amount of $30,420.00 as 
secretary of the corporation Calistoga Court 
Club, Inc. and personally, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto. 
Response No. 1: Admitted. 
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Moreover, the record indicates that the District Court 
did not examine any evidence outside the pleadings. (R. at 15-
20, 30-42.) Mountain America's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings was based on McClellan's Answer, which "[did] not deny 
the debt alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint. . . . " (R. at 17.) 
McClellan argues that the District Court may have looked at 
McClellan's response to a request for admission when granting its 
order. (Appellant's Brief at 12.) However, there is no evidence 
that the District Court considered said response, or any other 
evidence outside the pleadings. (R. at 15-20, 30-42.) In sum, 
to restate the obvious, there is no requirement that McClellan 
receive notice that matters outside the pleadings would be 
considered, when in fact, matters outside the pleadings were 
never considered. 
2. McClellan had sufficient opportunity to 
discover evidence that would establish 
his defense. 
McClellan argues next that "[d]espite his affidavit, 
showing that evidence was discoverable that would establish his 
defense, McClellan was not given an opportunity to pursue that 
discovery." (Appellant's Brief at 13; emphasis supplied.) Not 
(R. at 22; emphasis supplied.) McClellan asserts that "[t]he 
request establishes, at most, that McClellan personally delivered 
the note and was personally present when the note was signed by 
him as secretary of the corporation." (Appellant's Brief at 12 
n.4.) McClellan's assertion is unreasonable. The Request joins 
with the conjunctive "and" both verbs — execute and deliver — 
both of which are modified by the phrase "as secretary" and the 
phrase "and personally." Thus, McClellan was admitting personal 
liability on the Note. 
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only is this inaccurate, but McClellan has misstated the facts. 
McClellan never filed an affidavit pursuant to his defense as 
described in Appellant's Brief. Use of the phrase "his 
affidavit" referring to McClellan is a serious error. The 
affidavit referred to is that of McClellan's counsel at the time, 
James L. Shumate, in which counsel attempted to admit into 
evidence the substance of a conversation he had with Mr. Hoyt, 
co-maker on the Note. (Appellant's Brief at 13-14; R. at 81-84.) 
Mr. Hoyt allegedly stated that he and McClellan had signed the 
Note in their representative capacities as officers of Calistoga 
Court Club. The District Court properly excluded Shumate's 
affidavit as inadmissible hearsay. (Trans, of Hearing, Oct. 2, 
1990 at 12-13; R. at 232.) See also Walker v. Rockv Mt. 
Recreation Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973)(holding 
hearsay testimony not admissible if testified to at trial may not 
be set forth in affidavit supporting summary judgment). 
McClellan objects to the District Court's ruling on the 
basis that it did not afford him an opportunity to pursue 
discovery that would establish his defense. (Appellant's Brief 
at 13-14.) This objection is simply without merit. McClellan 
had from the time the order was entered until the hearing on his 
Motion to Set Aside, a period of over eight months, to discover 
evidence on the issue of whether McClellan believed he was 
signing the Note in his representative or personal capacity. (R. 
at 41, 76.) If the assertion that McClellan signed only in his 
representative capacity actually served as the basis of his 
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defense, in reality McClellan had over thirteen months to 
discover admissible evidence. This is the period of time from 
the filing of the Complaint until the hearing on McClellan's 
Motion to Set Aside. (R. at 2, 76.) 
The District Court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying McClellan's Motion to Set Aside based on the fact that 
McClellan had at least eight months and as many as thirteen 
months to discover admissible evidence, and the best "evidence" 
he could produce was inadmissible hearsay. There was no lack of 
opportunity to pursue discovery. Furthermore, it would have been 
improper for the District Court to grant McClellan more time to 
pursue discovery on matters that are inadmissible. As discussed 
earlier, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible where the document 
involved is clear and unambiguous. 
In order to grant McClellan7s Motion to Set Aside based 
on the lack of opportunity to pursue discovery, it must be shown 
that the "newly discovered evidence could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have been discovered and produced" at an earlier time. 
See Powers v. Gene's Blda. Materials, Inc.. 567 P.2d 174, 176 
(Utah 1977)(deciding analogous question of when new trial should 
be granted based on discovery of "new" evidence). Since Hoyt was 
the co-maker of the Note, with reasonable diligence McClellan 
could have discovered at a much earlier date whether Hoyt had any 
evidence regarding the question of signing capacity. In short, 
McClellan had sufficient opportunity to discover admissible 
evidence to support his Motion to Set Aside. 
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3. The affidavit of James L. Shumate could 
not have been properly treated as a Rule 
56(f) affidavit, and McClellan should 
not have been granted an opportunity to 
do discovery on the issues. 
Mountain America concedes that Rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to avoid summary judgment 
when there are important facts that are yet to be uncovered 
through discovery. Rule 56(f) provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is entitled "Summary 
judgment." James L. Shumate's affidavit was not submitted as an 
affidavit opposing summary judgment. Shumate's affidavit was 
submitted in support of McClellan's Motion to Set Aside a 
Judgment on the Pleadings that had been entered against 
McClellan. (R. at 81-84.) As such, Shumate's affidavit could 
not have been treated as a Rule 56(f) affidavit. Furthermore, 
McClellan's counsel never asserted prior to the District Court 
ruling on his Motion to Set Aside that Shumate's affidavit ought 
to be treated as a Rule 56(f) affidavit, nor did he request that 
the District Court grant him more time to conduct discovery. (R. 
at 74-90; Trans, of Hearing Oct. 2, 1990.) 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
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McClellan's Motion to Set Aside. The findings of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
MCCLELLAN'S SECOND MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT WHICH WAS BASED ON MOUNTAIN 
AMERICA'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
THE "ONE ACTION" RULE. 
Utah's one-action rule provides in relevant part: 
"There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the 
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real 
estate which action must be in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1992). When the debtor 
properly raises the one-action rule as an affirmative defense, 
the creditor is forced to exhaust the real property security 
before the creditor may obtain a personal judgment on the 
underlying note. City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 
P.2d 234, 235 (Utah 1991); J. David Milliner, Real Property 
Collateral; The "One-Action" Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 
557, 560 (1991). 
The District Court's refusal to set aside the January 
23, 1990 judgment should be upheld on appeal for several reasons. 
First, McClellan was under an obligation to raise the "one 
action" rule as an affirmative defense long before raising it in 
a Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment on November 13, 
1991. Second, even if McClellan had properly raised the "one 
action" rule as an affirmative defense in a timely manner, 
Mountain America qualifies for the junior lienholder exception 
under the rule — obviating the requirement of foreclosing on the 
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real property collateral before proceeding against McClellan 
personally. Finally, proceeding against McClellan on the Note 
merely operates as a waiver as to Mountain America's option to 
foreclose on the real property collateral. 
A. Failing to raise the Mone action" rule 
as an affirmative defense, McClellan 
waived the right to raise it on a Motion 
to Reconsider and Set Aside, 
Failure to call the applicability of the one-action 
rule to the attention of the court generally precludes the debtor 
from gaining any benefit therefrom. See, e.g., Salter v. Ulrich. 
138 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. 1943); Nevada Wholesale Lumber Co. v. Myers 
Realty, Inc., 544 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Nev. 1976).2 In fact, some 
cases explicitly hold that "[t]he fact that a note is secured is 
an affirmative defense which must be pleaded." See, e.g., Salter, 
138 P.2d at 9. 
Mountain America filed its Complaint on August 2, 1989. 
(R. at 2.) McClellan filed his Answer, in which the "one action" 
rule was not raised as an affirmative defense, on September 12, 
1989. (R. at 9.) Judgment was entered against McClellan on 
California adopted the first one-action rule in 1860. 1860 
Cal. Stat. ch. 314, § 23, p. 303-304. By 1911, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, and Utah adopted similar statutes. J. David Milliner, 
Real Property Collateral: The "One-Action" Rule in Action, 1991 
Utah L. Rev. 557, 558 (1991). It is a recognized rule of 
statutory construction that when the Legislature adopts a statute 
from another state, the presumption is that the Legislature is 
familiar with that state's judicial interpretations of that 
statute and intends to adopt them also. Jensen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1984). Court 
decisions from California and other jurisdictions dealing with 
the one-action rule thus become particularly persuasive in Utah 
courts. 
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January 23, 1990. (R. at 41.) It was not until November 13, 
1991 that McClellan raised an alleged violation of the "one 
action" rule as an affirmative defense in a Motion to Reconsider 
and Set Aside Judgment. (R. at 136.) Thus, McClellan did not 
raise the "one action" rule affirmative defense until more than 
twenty-six (26) months after he filed his Answer. This was also 
more than twenty-one (21) months after judgment had been entered 
against McClellan. 
Not only did McClellan fail to timely raise the 
affirmative defense, of the one-action rule in his Answer, but he 
attempted to raise the issue in a procedurally defective manner. 
In order to properly raise an affirmative defense after the 
responsive pleading has been filed, the party that wishes to 
raise the defense must move for leave of the court to file an 
amended answer. Olpin v. Grove Finance Co.. 521 P.2d 1221, 1223 
(Utah 1974). McClellan never moved the court for leave to file 
an amended answer in order to raise the affirmative defense of 
violation of the one action rule. 
The manner in which McClellan raised the issue of the 
one-action rule was grossly untimely. Furthermore, it was in 
violation of established procedural requirements for properly 
raising an affirmative defense after a responsive pleading has 
been filed. Thus, McClellan should have been barred from raising 
the issue. 
By way of providing some background, it is important to 
recognize that the "one action" rule is currently applied two 
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ways. See J. David Milliner, Real Property Collateral: The "One-
Action" Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 557, 560 (1991). 
First, the debtor can assert the rule as an affirmative defense, 
forcing the creditor to first foreclose on the real property 
collateral. Id. Second, where the creditor proceeds against the 
debtor personally on a note, although not raised as an 
affirmative defense, the debtor can assert the rule as a sanction 
against the creditor, operating as a waiver of the creditor7s 
right to foreclose its original lien. Id. at 561. (See 
subsection "C" below discussing how the sanction aspect of the 
one-action rule operates in this case.) 
Even though a debtor may fail to raise the one-action 
rule as an affirmative defense and later impose the "sanction" 
application of the rule, it does not mean a debtor can raise the 
rule as an affirmative defense on a motion to set aside after 
judgment has already been entered. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides: "In a pleading to a preceding 
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and 
satisfaction . . . estoppel . . . and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." (Emphasis 
supplied.) McClellan's Answer to Mountain America's complaint 
did not set forth the one-action rule as an affirmative defense. 
(R. at 9-11.) 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that "[a] party waives all defenses and objections which he does 
not present . . . in his answer or reply . . . ." Rule 12(h) 
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operates concurrently with Rule 8(c) as a waiver of defenses. 
For example, in Manger v. Davis. 619 P.2d 687, 692 (Utah 1980), 
the Court held that the failure to plead estoppel as a defense 
under Rule 8(c) waives the defense under Rule 12(h). Estoppel is 
one of the defenses listed in Rule 8(c) that one must assert in a 
responsive pleading. Under the rationale in Manger, McClellan 
has waived the right to assert the one-action affirmative defense 
under Rule 8(c) because it constitutes "any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense'..11 
The policy behind these rules is well-founded. If a 
party-defendant were able to raise an affirmative defense at any 
time in a proceeding, the wheels of justice would come to a 
grinding halt. Raising one defense after another, following the 
failure of each preceding defense, one could unjustly delay the 
resolution of disputes. Such a rationale would be contrary to 
our notions of specidy trial, fair administration of justice, 
judicial economy, and common decency. 
That failure to raise an affirmative defense operates 
as a waiver prevents unjust results. It is especially germane to 
the case at bar — McClellan should be precluded from raising the 
affirmative defense of the one-action rule more than two years 
after he filed his responsive pleading. A different result may 
be warranted were McClellan an individual who did not have at his 
disposal all the facts necessary to assert the one-action rule as 
an affirmative defense to his personal liability on the debt. 
However, this is not the case here. McClellan himself signed the 
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Trust Deed, securing the loan from Horizon Thrift, Mountain 
States' predecessor in interest. (R. at 186.) McClellan was 
aware of the existence of real property collateral since June 5, 
1984. (R. at 184.) Thus, McClellan was aware of all facts 
necessary to timely raise the one-action rule as an affirmative 
defense. Failing to raise the defense, McClellan should now be 
barred from doing so. 
B. Assuming, arguendo, McClellan had 
properly raised the one-action rule as 
an affirmative defense. Mountain States 
would still prevail based on the "junior 
lienholder" exception to the one-action 
rule. 
The one-action rule has no application in this case. 
In Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, 88 Utah 577, 
583, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"where the security has been lost through no fault of the 
mortgagee, an action may be maintained directly upon the personal 
obligation evidenced by the note without going through the idle 
and fruitless procedure of foreclosure." More recently, the 
Court reiterated Utah's adoption of the "junior lienholder 
exception" in City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 
234, 237 (Utah 1991). Mountain America qualifies for the junior 
lienholder exception. Because the senior lienholder foreclosed 
on the real property securing the Note, Mountain America can 
properly bring suit against McClellan personally. 
Zion's First National Bank, the senior lienholder on 
the real property collateral, became beneficiary under a Trust 
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Deed securing a $10,106.00 loan, executed March 26, 1984, and 
recorded March 28, 1984. (See Addendum Exhibit "B".) Horizon 
Thrift, Mountain America's predecessor in interest, as junior 
lienholder, became beneficiary under a Trust Deed securing a 
$31,910.58 loan, executed June 5, 1984, and recorded June 18, 
1984. (See Addendum Exhibit "C"; R. at 184.) Because Utah is a 
race-notice jurisdiction, the first trust deed recorded has 
priority. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3; Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 
979 (Utah 1979). Based on the foregoing, Mountain America 
qualifies as a junior lienholder. 
On September 6, 1988, the senior lienholder foreclosed 
on the real property securing Mountain America's loan. (R. at 
182; a copy of the Trustee's Deed is attached hereto as Addendum 
Exhibit flDfl.) Because Mountain America qualifiers as a junior 
lienholder, and the senior lienholder foreclosed on the property, 
rendering it valueless, Mountain America can proceed against 
McClellan personally on the Note. 
1. The typographical error in the l€*cral 
description of Zion's prior recorded 
deed is not fatal and does not render 
Zions subordinate to Mountain America. 
The senior lienholder's deed, recorded March 28, 1984, 
contained a typographical error in the legal description of the 
property. (Compare Addendum Exhibit "B" with Addendum Exhibit 
"C".) The error was found in one digit of one of the numerical 
measurements — "116.37 ft." should have been "14.6.37 ft." 
Zion's rerecorded the deed on February 19, 1988, with the correct 
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digit. (See Addendum Exhibit "E".) It is important to point out 
that this was the only error in the description. Because of this 
typographical error, McClellan argues that "Mountain America's 
lienholder position was in fact that of a senior creditor." 
(Appellant's Brief at 19.) 
Such a minor error does not constitute a sufficiently 
material flaw so as to place Mountain America in the position of 
senior lienholder. The description found in the first deed was 
materially sufficient to place anyone on notice that this 
particular piece of property was encumbered. Utah law stipulates 
that "[a] recorded document imparts notice of its contents 
regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in its 
execution, attestation, or acknowledgment." Utah Code Ann. § 57-
4a-2 (1990). It is commonly accepted that 
property covered by [a] mortgage will be held 
to be described with sufficient accuracy, and 
will impart constructive notice through the 
operation of the recording statutes, if one 
examining the mortgage may, from the language 
of the mortgage and the information gained 
from the inquiry clearly suggested by the 
language of the mortgage, identify the 
specific land intended to be included. 
Washington v. Slack. 813 P.2d 447, 450 (Mont. 1991)(deed with 
minor error in legal description still imparted constructive 
notice and did not effect priority date). 
Based on Utah law and commonly accepted principles of 
notice law, Mountain America did not move into a senior 
lienholder position as the result of a one-digit typographical 
error in the property description. More importantly, McClellan 
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was never affected by the one-digit error in the* land 
description. Normally, one who relies to their detriment on an 
erroneously recorded deed can seek relief for such reliance. 
McClellan never detrimentally relied on Zion's prior recorded 
deed. 
2• Mountain America had no obligation to 
allege and prove that a senior 
lienholder foreclosed on and rendered 
valueless the real property collateral. 
In Lockhart Co. v. Eguitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 
1333, 1336 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court limited the 
"junior lienholder" exception to the one-action rule. In 
Lockhart, the debtor alleged by way of affirmative defense in 
their answer, that the creditor had failed to exhaust their 
security interest before resorting to an action on the note. Id. 
at 1334. Nevertheless, the creditor attempted to maintain an 
action based on a "speculated or estimated deficiency" because a 
senior lienholder's interest appeared to exceed the value of the 
property and would thus render the junior lienholder's interest 
of no value. Id. The Lockhart court held that the creditor in 
this case must allege and prove that the security had become 
valueless, and not merely "speculate that the security is 
valueless, or might become valueless if foreclosed by the senior 
lienholder." Idk. at 1336. 
McClellan asserts that Mountain America "has failed to 
show anything in the record where it has alleged or proved the 
exhaustion of the collateral." (Appellant's Brief at 19.) 
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Furthermore, McClellan argues based on the Lockhart decision, 
that Mountain America must allege and prove that the property was 
valueless. (Appellant's Brief at 19.) In short, McClellan's 
argument misconstrues one-action law altogether. 
First, as set forth above, the one-action rule is an 
affirmative defense that the debtor must raise or it is waived. 
It is not incumbent on the creditor to allege compliance 
therewith before proceeding on a note. McClellan never properly 
raised the one-action rule as an affirmative defense. 
Second, the Lockhart decision was based on the fact 
that the debtor had raised the issue of noncompliance with the 
one-action rule as an affirmative defense in their answer. The 
one-action rule had been properly placed in issue. The creditor 
in Lockhart failed to respond to the debtor's affirmative 
defense, thus the court properly found in favor of the debtor 
based on the creditor's failure to allege and prove that the 
security had become valueless. Again, McClellan never placed the 
one-action rule in issue in this case, and accordingly, Mountain 
America never had a burden to allege and prove that the security 
had become valueless. 
Third, the Lockhart decision is pragmatically confined 
to its facts. Lockhart is significant because the junior 
creditor had proceeded against the debtor prior to the 
consummation of the foreclosure action prosecuted by the senior 
creditor. Lockhart, 657 P.2d at 1336. For this reason, Lockhart 
was able to distinguish the Cache Valley decision which held that 
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"where the security has been lost through no fault of the 
mortgagee, an action may be maintained directly upon the personal 
obligation evidenced by the note without going through the idle 
and fruitless procedure of foreclosure." Lockhart, 657 P.2d at 
1336 (quoting Cache Valley. 88 Utah at 583, 56 P.2d at 1049). In 
Cache Vallev. 88 Utah at 579-80, 56 P.2d at 1047, the senior 
lienholder had for€»closed on the security prior to the junior 
lienholder commencing an action on the note. The Cache Vallev 
decision is controlling in this case. Zion/s Bank, the senior 
lienholder foreclosed on the property prior to the commencement 
of this action. To require Mountain America to allege and prove 
that the security had been rendered valueless would amount to 
another "idle and fruitless procedure." 
In short, Mountain America is under no duty to allege 
and prove that the security has become valueless. McClellan 
bears the burden of first putting the question at issue by 
raising the one-action rule as an affirmative defense. Lockhart 
is easily distinguishable from the facts of the case at bar. As 
Lockhart specifically sets forth, the Cache Valley decision is 
controlling because the property here was rendered valueless 
prior to the commencement of this action. 
C. The "sanction" application of the one-
action rule would merely operate as a 
waiver of Mountain America's option to 
foreclose on the secured propertyr and 
McClellan would still be personally 
liable on the debt. 
Assuming, arguendo, that McClellan did not have an 
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obligation to raise the one-action rule as an affirmative defense 
and that Mountain America does not qualify for the junior 
lienholder exception, proceeding against McClellan personally on 
the Note only waives Mountain America's option to foreclose on 
the secured property. (See discussion of "sanction" application 
above, pages 17-18.) Where a creditor brings an action against 
the debtor personally before the real property collateral has 
been exhausted, then the creditor is open to sanction. The 
"sanction" application of the one-action rule has been described 
as follows: 
Although the debtor may have failed to use 
the rule as an affirmative defense, the 
debtor can still assert the rule as a 
sanction against the creditor for not having 
first foreclosed on the security. In this 
case the creditor has violated the * security 
first' principle of the rule, waived its 
security in the collateral, and thereby lost 
the right to foreclose its original lien. 
J. David Milliner, Real Property Collateral; The "One-Action" 
Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 557, 558 (1991). Thus, 
assuming Mountain America has proceeded against McClellan in 
violation of the one-action rule, at most, Mountain America has 
lost the right to foreclose on the real property collateral. 
This is a nullity since the senior lienholder foreclosed on the 
security prior to the commencement of this action in the District 
Court. 
The "sanction" application of the one-action rule is 
consistent with the original intent of one-action statutes. 
There is evidence that state legislatures intended to force 
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creditors to elect between either foreclosing on the security or 
seeking a personal judgment on the note. Note, Mortgage 
Foreclosure; The One Action Rule in Utah, 6 Utah L. Rev. 560, 560 
(1959); Bacon v. Ravbould, 4 Utah 357, 360, 10 P. 481, 482-83, 
reh'cr denied. 4 Utah 357, 11 P. 510 (1886). Sanctioning the 
creditor, by causing a forfeiture of the right to foreclose on 
the security when proceeding against the debtor personally, 
preserves the "one action" nature of the one-action rule. 
As the case law illustrates, this is the most commonly 
employed sanction against the creditor who violates the one-
action rule. The California Supreme Court has stated the 
principle as follows; 
If the debtor successfully raises the [rule] 
as an affirmative defense, the creditor will 
be forced to exhaust the security before he 
may obtain a money judgment against the 
debtor for any deficiency. If the debtor 
does not raise the [rule] as an affirmative 
defense, he may still invoke it as a sanction 
against the creditor on the basis that the 
latter by not foreclosing on the security in 
the action brought to enforce the debt, has 
made an election of remedies and waiveid the 
security. 
Walker v. Community Bank. 518 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal. 1974). The 
California Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed the "waiver of 
security" principle in Security Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Wozab, 800 
P.2d 557, 563 (Cal. 1990). See also Nevada Wholesale Lumber Co. 
v. Mvers Realty. Inc.. 544 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Nev. 1976)(Nevada's 
adoption of the "waiver of security" principle). 
A different sanction involves the complete forfeiture 
of the remaining debt. Milliner at 562. "In the few cases that 
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have imposed this sanction, the courts have forfeited the debt 
after concluding that a creditor had completed its one action 
without collecting the entire debt." Id. Any additional attempt 
to collect the debt is considered to be an attempt to violate the 
"one action" principle of the rule. Id. Interestingly, the 
California Supreme Court recently held that in order to invoke a 
sanction that involves the forfeiture of the remaining debt, 
there must have been a prior judicial action. Wozab, 800 P.2d at 
561 (1990). This type of forfeiture sanction is not available in 
this case. The action brought in the District Court is the first 
and only action brought to recover the debt. There has been no 
prior judicial action that would violate the "one action" nature 
of the rule, and justify the creditor forfeiting the remainder of 
the debt. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
MCCLELLAN'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND TO ASSERT A 
CROSS CLAIM. 
Pursuant to Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a party may plead a "cross-claim . . . against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the original transaction. . . . " Utah R. Civ. 
P. 13(f). Once a responsive pleading has been filed, "a party 
may amend his [or her] pleading only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
McClellan filed his Motion for Leave to File a Third-
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Party Complaint and to Assert a Cross-claim on October 28, 1991. 
(R. at 111.) This motion was twelve months after McClellan,s 
first Motion to Set Aside was denied (R. at 88), twenty-one 
months after judgment had been entered against McClellan (R. at 
41-42), and over two years after McClellan filed his Answer (R. 
at 9-11). 
Judgment had already been entered against McClellan 
when he brought the Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party 
Complaint and to Assert a Cross-claim. (R. at 41-42, 111.) 
McClellan could not amend an answer (his relevant "pleading") 
pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
without first moving the court to set aside the previously 
rendered judgment against him. Any motion to amend his answer, 
if granted, would become meaningless if the judgment against him 
remained in place. 
Moreover, the District Court's denial of McClellan's 
Motion for Leave was not an abuse of discretion. It is beyond 
dispute that even though Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure favors granting leave to amend, "the matter remains in 
the sound discretion of the trial court." Westley v. Farmer's 
Ins. Exchange. 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). 
There are two issues, inter alia, that the reviewing 
court examines when determining whether the trial abused its 
discretion in denying leave to amend a pleading. First, by 
McClellan's own admission, "[c]ourts are much less likely to 
grant an amendment when the amendment will delay the adjudication 
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of the case.11 (Appellant's brief at 21; citing Girard v. 
Appleby. 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); Hein's Turkey Hatcheries. Inc, 
v, Nephi Processing Plaint. Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 
(Utah 1970)). McClellan's Motion for Leave came unreasonably 
late in the proceeding — twenty-one months after judgment had 
been entered against McClellan (R. at 41-42), and over two years 
after McClellan filed his Answer (R. at 9-11). Moreover, 
McClellan filed his Motion for Leave just two months before the 
entry of final judgment. (R. at 190-93.) By this time, the case 
had progressed so far that it was ripe for final judgment. 
Certainly, in the interest of judicial economy, the District 
Court was well within its discretion in denying McClellan's 
Motion for Leave. See, e.g.. Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794, 798 
(Utah App. 1987)(denial of motion to allow counter-claim and 
third party complaint 13 months after filing answer not an abuse 
of discretion). 
Second, reviewing courts examine whether the substance 
of the moving parties "new" allegation was known prior to 
bringing the motion. Westley. 663 P.2d at 94. McClellan was, or 
should have been aware at all times of any potential liability of 
Hoyt, the co-maker of the Note, or any shareholders of Calistoga 
Court Club. The Note signed by McClellan included Hoyt's 
signature, as well as the designation of Calistoga as a co-maker. 
(R. at 4.) Surely McClellan had all the material facts necessary 
to form the basis of any theories of joint liability or 
indemnification since the filing of the Complaint on August 2, 
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1989, 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
McClellan/s Motion for Leave was untimely. Moreover, McClellan 
at all relevant times had all the information necessary to bring 
a cross-claim or third party complaint, but for some reason did 
not do so. This Court should affirm the District Court's denial 
of McClellan's Motion for Leave as a decision that accords with 
its broad powers of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, the 
District Court's Order granting judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of Mountain America, as well as its refusal to set aside 
judgment or grant leave to file a cross claim and third party 
claims should all be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this <^> day of July 1992. 
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THIS TRUST DEED, made this 2 6 t h day of March ^
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- CALISTOGA COURT CLUB, INC, a Utah Corporation, Edward Burgess, President; 
Curtis Lang, Secretary/treasurer -
 nTRUSTOR 
whose address is P- °- B ° * * g Cedar_City Utah 
(Stnwt and Numbtr) (City) (Stat*) 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
authorized to do business 
in Utah, under the laws of Utah, and in such capacity herein called TRUSTEE, and THE LOCKHART CO.. a Utah Corporation, 
and in such capacity herein called BENEFICIARY, for whose benefit this Trust Deed is given. 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following 
IRON described property, situated In Z-Z2 County, State of Utah: 
Beginning S 0 18f27M E, 1408.40 f t . along the sec t ion l ine and N 71°44 ,14M W, 
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Fiddlers Canyon, : Cedar City, Utah 
which has an address of __ 
(Strttt) (City) 
Utah 8 ^ 7 2 0 ("Property Address"). 
(Zip COd«) 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon or hereafter erected and all water rights, rights of way. ease-
ments, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or 
hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority here-
inafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING in such order as Beneficiary may elect (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced 
by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $_ X01Q6.QQ — , made by Trustor, payable to 
the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals 
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such addi-
tional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed, and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by 
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided. 
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TRUSTEE'S DEED 
THIS DEED. anode by SECURITY TTTUE COMPANY OTSOtfTaTERN UTAH as T w » — f a the 
f Deed of Trent fhar— caaad Tiaatt^and ASSOCI4TXS FTMARCIAL SEhTICE CO. 
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TRUST DEED 
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this §£fe day of MhBCH ,
 1 9 _OU 9mong 
- CALI3T0GA COURT CIXJB, IMC, i Utah CorporatioD, Edward Bargee* President, 
Ourtia Lang. Sec« Treasurer -
 M TRUSTOR, 
whose address Is E«0> BOX ^ 3 , CBDAR CITY, UTAH 81ff20 
(StrMt Mid Number) (City) (SUM) 
ZIONS FIRST MATIOMAL BAHK Hk authorized to do business 
in Utah, under the laws of Utah, and in such capacity herein called TRUSTEE and THE LOCKHART CO. a Utah Corporation, 
and in such capacity herein called BENEFICIARY, for whose benefit this Trust Deed is given 
WITNESSETH That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER OF SALE, the following 
described property, tituttod m ± E 2 l County, State of Utah 
Beginning S 0°18,27,« E, 1408.40 ft. along the section line and N 71 44'14" W, 
2038.06 ft. from the Ei corner section 35, T35S, R11W, SLM; thence S 18 15*46" 
V, 146.37 ft., thence S 43°00'00" W, 91.18 ft; thence along the arc of a curve 
to the left, (radius point for which bears S 43°00,00" W, 100.00 ft.), a 
distance of 43.17 ft; thence N 71°44,14" W, 95.00 ft; thence N 18°15,46" E, 
220.00 ft; thence S 71°44,14M E, 175.00 ft. along the S'ly line Fiddlers 
Canyon access road to the point of beginning. Containing 0.858 acres of land. 
This Trust Deed is being re-^rBonrded to correct the legal description. 
. s a s ^ 
Aa»a»dat SECURITY TITLE CO SO UT 
fltqut* of 
FEB 19 1988 ^j* 
$9 oo 375- « 907-9105 f c C u R irt TITLE COMPANY ZJ. Book * * - /3>#2«£- / ^ - ^ S i " 
By OWE 8 UATMESON, IRON (XXJNTY RECORDER 
R*dO * * * D « * * £ * « * D 
Cj HULET. IRON COUNTY REC 
lnd*'d D Abetd Q 
,
 fc fc ^ , FIEDLERS CANTON, CEEAR CITT, UTAH which has an address of ±^±u***> w ' u w y \*nu*u\ VJ.± ±f w^rw 
(Stfwt) (City) 
UUh txfiTO ("Pro^rty Address"). 
(Zip C o * ) 
Together with all buildings fixtures and improvements thereon or hereafter erected and all water rights rights of way, ease-
ments rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging now or 
hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof. SUBJECT. HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority here-
inafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits. 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING in such order as Beneficiary may elect (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced 
by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $_&8333L*80 made by Trustor payable to 
the order of Beneficiary at the times. In the manner and with interest as therein set forth and any extensions and/or renewals 
or modifications thereof, (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained, (3) the payment of such addi-
tional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed, and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by 
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms f p f > f t f # f i f t h ^ ) j M interest thereon as herein provided. — •> * / > 
w« 375 rut 907 
1200-0040 10/S2 
TO PROTECT AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES. 
1 To pay. perform, observe and discharge each and every condition, obligation, covenant and agreement for which this 
irusf Deed has been given as security as provided above. 
2 To keep said property in good condition and repair: not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or 
roatore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; 
to comply with all Jaws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to com-
mit suffer or permi\ any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said 
property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general. 
3 If the loan
 #4ecureel hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improve-
merrts on said property. Trustor agrees (a) to commence construction promptly and to pursue the same with reasonable diligence 
to completion In accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and (b) to allow Beneficiary to inspect the 
property at aft times during construction. 
In the event Trustor does not complete construction of the improvements in accordance with the plans and specifications 
and to the satisfaction of Beneficiary within eighteen months from the date hereof, unless otherwise extended by the Benefi-
ciary at its option, or if work on such construction should cease before completion and the work should remain abandoned 
for a period of 30 days, then and in either event. Beneficiary at its option may declare the entire indebtedness secured by 
this Trust Deed together with interest thereon, to be immediately due and payable. 
4. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on the improve-
ments now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried in companies approved 
by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. In event of loss. Trustor shall give 
immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and eacn insurance company concerned is hereby authorized and 
directed to make payment for such loss directly to Beneficiary instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance 
proceeds or any p a l thereof, may be applied by Beneficiary, at its option, to the reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured 
or to the restoration or repair of the property damaged. 
5 To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence 
of title as Beneficiary may require including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or renewals 
thereof or supplements thereto 
6 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said property. 
oi the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee: and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any such 
action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum 
.ncurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
7 To pay at least 10 days before delinquency alt taxes and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments 
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said 
property; to pay. when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at 
any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees and expenses of this Trust Deed. 
8. To promptly and completely observe, perform, and discharge each and every condition, covenant and agreement affect-
ing the property which is or may be prior and superior hereto including specifically any other mortgage. Trust Deed or other 
security interest which constitutes a lien against the property. Any default by Trustor in the payment or performance of any 
condition, covenant or agreement under a prior and superior mortgage, trust deed or other security interest shall constitute a 
default hereunder and Beneficiary, at its option may declare all sums secured hereby to be immediately due and payable. 
if the security hereunder is or will be a condominium, community apartment or part of a planned development. Trustor 
agrees to perform each and every provision under any Declaration of Covenants. Conditions and Restrictions pertaining to the 
jondomimum community apartment or planned development project. 
9 Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without 
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, 
may Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof. 
Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes, commence, appear in and defend any 
action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, 
contest or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior 
hereto: and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including disbursements for evidence of title, and reasonable attorney s fees 
10 Trustor will immediately pay to Beneficiary or Trustee, upon demand, all sums which may be advanced from time to 
time by Beneficiary or Trustee for Taxes, assessments, water rates and governmental charges, insurance on the premises, 
maintaining this Trust Deed as a valid and subsisting lien upon the premises including but not limited to advancing payments 
on a pnor mortgage. Trust Deed or other security interest to avoid any default thereunder, and for any other proper cost or 
expenses of preserving, repairing and maintaining the premises or the lien of this Trust Deed. All such advances shall be 
optional on the part of Trustee or Beneficiary, and if made shall be secured by the lien of this Trust Deed, and each such 
advance shall bear interest from the date thereof at the rate provided for in the promissory note for which this Trust Deed is 
given as security 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
i t If all or any part of the property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Trustor without the prior written con-
sent of Beneficiary. Beneficiary may at its option, declare all sums secured by this Trust Deed to be immediately due and 
payable. Consent to one tuch transaction by the Beneficiary shall not constitute a waiver of the right to require such consent 
to future or successive transactions. 
If Trustor is a corporation, trust, limited or general partnership or joint venture, should there occur a sale, conveyance, 
transfer, disposition or encumbrance either voluntarily or involuntarily or should an agreement be entered into to accomplish 
the same with respect to: (a) more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the issued and outstanding stock if Trustor is a corpora-
tion, (b) the beneficial interest if Trustor is a trust, or (c) any general partnership or joint venture interest if Trustor is a limited 
or general partnership or n joint venture; or if there shall occur a change in any general partner or joint venturer if Trustor is 
a limned or general partnership or joint venture, then Beneficiary may. at is option, declare all sums secured by this Trust Deed 
to be immediately due and payable. Consent to one such transaction shall not constitute a waiver of the right to require such 
consent to future or successive transactions. 
12 Should said property ot any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemna-
tion proceeding or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or In any other manner. Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, 
awards and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in its 
own name, any action or procedlngs. or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. 
A.I sucn compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and 
otner insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, 
including attorneys fees, apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further 
assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
13 Without affecting the liability of any person, including Trustor, for the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby, 
or the lien of this Trust Deed on the remainder of the property for the full amount of any indebtedness unpaid, Beneficary 
and Trustee are respectively empowered as follows: Beneficiary may from time to time and without notice (a) release any per-
son liable for the payment of any of the indebtedness, (b) extend the time or otherwise alter the terms of payment of any of 
the indebtedness, (c) alter, substitute or release any property securing the indebtedness; Trustee may, at any time, and from 
time to time, upon the written request of Beneficiary (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of the property, (b) join in 
granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon, (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust 
Deed or the lien or charge thereof, (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of the property. 
14. The indebtedness secured by these trusts may now or hereafter be further secured by security agreements, mortgages, 
deeds of trust, pledges, contracts or guaranty or other additional securities. Beneficiary or Trustee may. at the option of both 
or either of them, exhaust any one or more of said securities as well as the security hereunder, either concurrently or inde-
pendently, and in such* order as they or either of them may determine, and apply the proceeds received upon the indebtedness 
secured hereby without affecting that status of. or waiving any right to exhaust all or any other security, including the security 
hereunder, and without waiving any breach or default or any right of power, whether exercised hereunder or contained herein. 
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15. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, ail rents, issues, 
royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon. Until Trustor 
shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor 
shall have the right to collect all such rmnts. issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to default as they become due and 
payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall 
have the right, with or without taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and 
profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys snail not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing con-
tained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be an affirmation by Bene-
ficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this 
Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
16. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by 
a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and 
without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said 
property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past 
due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
17. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues. Mnd profits, or the 
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the 
application or release thereof as-aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any 
act done pursuant to such notice. 
18. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such 
right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
19. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the 
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option 
of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default 
and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and trustees shall file such notice for record 
in each county wherein said property or some part of parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee the 
note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby 
20. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by taw following the recordation of said notice of default, and 
notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law. Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell 
said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, 
and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, 
if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable 
in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems 
expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and. in every such case, notice of postponement 
shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and piece last appointed for the sale; provided, if the 
sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in 
the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said 
property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the Deed of any matters or facts 
shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply 
the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the 
payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees. (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue 
stamps on Trustee s Deed. (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at the rate pro-
vided for in the promissory note for which this Trust Deed is given as security from date of expenditure. (4) all other sums then 
secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, 
may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
21. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the hereinabove described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid 
sale, immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor. 
22. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby 
immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages 
on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
23. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of 
each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution 
is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of 
any successor trustee Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof 
thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
24. This Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, 
administrators, executors, successors, and assigns. All obligations of Trustor h^rmuno'er are joint and several. The term 
"Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever 
the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
25. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as pro-
vided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of any action 
or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
2& This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
27. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed 
to Trustor at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
S / CAHSTOQA COURT CI1TB, TNC^ 
Br fd^^\J-£XL\ASL^^ t'-l^cdtiCf . 
Edward Burgess^ p ^ s i d e n t 
*•* s 
IRON 
C u r t i a ^ a n g , Sec#~Treasurtr STATE 0 £ UTAH V 
; : c f i M f t . ^ r f f i f r / : d a v o f MARSH 19.81*-. personally appeared before me 
:>
^^f^JFJ9Bi. known to ne to h» th« Pr««H«w *, n™ 
•-•*ietSe>K, Trtasuiw of CAHSTOQA COURT CHJB, JJK\ ' 
Jfte^sfenec ,a>Y ef the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to* me that. 
:
- * ^
y
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 NOrtwnHjBLlc 
**J<rw< ? * — Residing at: 
My Commission expires: C e d a r C i t y . U t a h 
"J? 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO TRUSTEE. 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Trust Deed. 
Said note together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby 
requested and directed, on payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said 
note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together 
with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the 
•state now held by you thereunder. 
Dated 19- THE LOCKHART CO., 
by-
Authorized Signature 
O recorded 
O unrecorded 
Mail reconveyance to . 
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